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Beliefs about collective outcomes, such as economic growth or firm profitability, play an 
important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, 
we explore whether over-optimism and self-serving biases in information processing—
documented for beliefs about individual outcomes—affect beliefs about collective outcomes. We 
find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases 
are similar to biases for individual outcomes. In addition, we investigate whether collective self-
delusion is mitigated by market institutions. If anything, biases in information processing are 
more pronounced in the presence of a market.  
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1. Introduction 
There is overwhelming evidence that individuals tend to maintain overly positive beliefs about 
their abilities (e.g. Svenson, 1981; Quattrone and Tversky, 1984), the likelihood of desired future 
life events (e.g. Irwin, 1953; Weinstein, 1980; Mayraz, 2013) and their own morality (e.g. 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2016; Gino, Norton and Weber, 2016). Such over-optimism often appears 
to result from biases in how people acquire and process information: individuals avoid 
information that challenges their overly positive beliefs (e.g. Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2007; 
Oster, Shoulson and Dorsey, 2013; Ganguly and Tasoff, 2017), update less in response to bad 
news than to good news (e.g. Eil and Rao, 2011; Möbius et al., 2017), and are less likely to 
remember negative past signals than positive past signals (Zimmermann, 2020; Saucet and 
Villeval, 2019). Such biases are supported by the psychological and motivational benefits from 
optimism and maintaining a positive self-image (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Rabin, 1994; 
Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006 and 2011; Bénabou, 2013). 
Most existing work on over-optimism and self-delusion focuses on beliefs about 
desirable individual outcomes. However, in many important economic contexts, people have to 
form beliefs about collective outcomes, such as future economic growth, firm profitability or 
success in containing the outbreak of a pandemic.1 As with the benefits from maintaining a 
desirable self-image, people may often be motivated to maintain beliefs that collective outcomes 
will also be positive. For example, individuals may benefit psychologically and may be 
motivated to engage in productive activities like work and investment when they believe that 
future economic conditions will be positive. Similarly, employees in a firm may find it desirable 
and motivating to believe that the company is and will continue to perform well. The same 
motives that underlie self-delusion regarding individual outcomes could, therefore, also affect 
information processing about collective outcomes. This could, in turn, yield important economic 
consequences, as collective over-optimism and wishful-thinking about the price growth of 
widely held assets are believed to play an important role in the formation of speculative bubbles 
																																																								
1 Multiple studies provide evidence that beliefs about macroeconomic expectations matter for economic decision making (e.g., 
Armona, Fuster and Zafar, 2019; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020; Andre et al, 2019). There is some previous work that investigates the 
role of personal experience in belief formation for collective outcomes (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2016; Kuchler and Zafar, 
2019; Cotofan, Cassar, Dur and Meier, 2021). 
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(Shiller, 2002; Foote, Gerardi and Willen, 2012; Cheng, Raina and Xiong, 2014) and in 
explaining market anomalies such as the equity home bias puzzle (Strong and Xu, 2003).2  
In this paper, we study whether self-serving biases in information processing exist for 
beliefs about collective outcomes, and directly compare them to the beliefs that agents form over 
individual outcomes.3 A challenge in investigating this question using naturally occurring 
collective outcomes is that the information generating process in such contexts is typically 
unknown, and, as a consequence, we do not know the rational benchmark for belief updating. To 
overcome this challenge, we design a laboratory experiment in which we can construct the 
information generating process and hold key aspects of it fixed when comparing belief updating 
for collective outcomes with belief updating for individual outcomes. We find that participants 
exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that biases are remarkably similar to 
biases for beliefs about individual outcomes. We thereby provide important evidence that 
motivated reasoning matters for the formation of beliefs about collective outcomes. 
In our experiment, subjects perform a task based on reasoning ability, with their relative 
performance determining whether or not they receive a monetary prize. After completing the 
task, individuals receive noisy signals about their relative performance. We elicit their beliefs 
about relative performance, both before and after receiving the noisy signals. By relying on 
individual ability, this task creates the conditions that have been found to give rise to self-serving 
information processing, whereby positive information is over weighted relative to negative 
information (Eil and Rao, 2011; Möbius, et al., 2017).  
In our first principal treatment condition, Individual, participants work independently on 
the above task. Each individual is matched with another participant, and relative individual 
performance on the task in the pair determines who wins a monetary prize. We elicit 
participants’ beliefs of the relative likelihood that they outperformed their competitor, both 
before and after providing them with a noisy signal of their relative performance. The Individual 
																																																								
2 There is some suggestive evidence that motivated beliefs might affect market outcomes. Strong and Xu (2003) show that—in 
line with wishful thinking—fund managers are significantly more optimistic towards their home equity market. Cheng, Raina and 
Xiong (2014) present evidence on the role of overconfidence in financial crises. Ma (2015) find that banks with CEOs who were 
more optimistic about future payoffs of housing investments had worse crisis performance. Collective self-delusion is also 
believed to affect corporate behavior. Anecdotal evidence suggests that collective denial of unethical and illegal business 
practices played a role in corporate scandals (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi, 2005; Bénabou, 2013). 
3 A recent paper, somewhat related to ours, investigates how individuals’ beliefs are influenced by observing the beliefs of other 
individuals of similar (true) ability (Oprea and Yuksel, 2020). They find that exposure to such beliefs increases the degree of 
positivity bias. A key difference between our studies and theirs is that we directly investigate beliefs over collective outcomes, 
while their study retains a focus on beliefs about individual ability. 
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condition provides us with a benchmark of self-serving biases in forming and updating beliefs 
about individual outcomes. Consistent with earlier work, we find both initial overconfidence and 
evidence of asymmetric updating—with individuals overweighting positive signals relative to 
negative ones—for beliefs about individual outcomes. While not the main focus of our project, 
this replication is of interest in itself as there is conflicting evidence on the existence of 
asymmetric updating (Buser, et al., 2018; Coutts, 2019; Schwardmann and Van der Weele, 2020; 
Oprea and Yuksel, 2020).4 
Our main alternative condition, Collective, is identical except that the task and relative 
beliefs now involve the performance of six-person groups. Group members perform the task 
together, submitting a common response, and communicate with each other via a chat box. Each 
group competes with another six-person group, with the higher-performing group obtaining a 
prize. Hence, whether or not the group outperforms the other group is a collective outcome, 
determined by the joint performance of group members. We elicit incentivized beliefs about the 
group’s relative performance, both before and after providing a noisy signal.  
Our results provide clear evidence of self-serving biases in the formation of collective 
beliefs. We document such biases in two ways. First, the priors reveal that subjects exhibit 
overconfidence over collective outcomes. Second, we find that subjects update their beliefs 
asymmetrically, that is, they update less in response to bad news about their group’s relative 
performance than to good news. Moreover, we also document other biases in the formation of 
beliefs about collective outcomes that are also present in the formation of beliefs about 
individual performance. For example, we find that subjects exhibit substantial conservatism 
when updating beliefs about collective performance—that is, they do not react as strongly to 
signals as they should according to the rational (Bayesian) benchmark—and base-rate neglect. 
All of the above biases are qualitatively similar to those we observe in the Individual condition. 
We thus conclude that biased information processing exists for collective outcomes in a manner 
similar to how it occurs for individual outcomes. 
																																																								
4 Eil and Rao (2011), Sharot, Korn and Dolan (2011), Garrett and Sharot (2014), and Wiswall and Zafar (2015) find evidence for 
asymmetric updating. Ertac (2011) find that people put more weight on negative signals. These studies differ substantially from 
the Möbius et al. (2017) framework, making comparisons across studies challenging. Cacault and Grieder (2019) find evidence 
for asymmetric updating about others’ ability. Coutts, Gerhards and Murad (2020) investigate self-attribution bias in the context 
of belief updating. Barron (2021), Coutts (2019) and Gotthard-Real (2017) look at updating of non-ego-relevant information, and 
find no asymmetric updating. 
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We also conduct an additional treatment condition to investigate whether an information-
aggregation institution, such as a market, influences the formation of collective self-delusion. 
Self-delusion about collective outcomes might be particularly important in market contexts, such 
as asset trading. While individual biases might be mitigated by the collective judgment produced 
in markets (Camerer, 1987; Camerer et al., 1989; Forsythe et al., 1992), market interactions with 
others that have similar motives for self-deception could also reinforce biased beliefs (Shiller, 
2002; Seybert and Bloomfield, 2009; Kogan, Kwasnica and Weber, 2011; Bénabou, 2013).  
The Market condition is identical to Collective, except that after subjects receive 
feedback regarding their group’s relative performance, they participate in an asset market in 
which they trade assets with the other members of their group. Each asset pays a positive 
dividend if their group wins the competition, but no dividend if their group loses the competition. 
This reflects a market situation where traders may engage in wishful-thinking about the value of 
an asset, either because they are financially committed to it (Shiller, 2002) or because they are 
elsewise affected by the profitability of the issuer, for example in the case of assets from a major 
local employer. After subjects have participated in the market, we elicit beliefs about their 
group’s relative performance. 
We find that market prices depart substantially from fundamentals, reflecting 
overconfidence, asymmetric updating, and reluctance to bet against the occurrence of desired 
outcomes. This suggests that collective self-delusion might indeed play an important role in 
market contexts. More importantly, we do not find that markets mitigate biases in information 
processing. If anything, we find that the market institution exacerbates biases: compared to the 
Collective condition, subjects underreact even more to bad signals in the Market condition than 
in the Collective condition, resulting in higher degrees of asymmetric updating.  
Our findings add an important dimension to the growing body of evidence on the 
formation of self-serving beliefs. Given the widespread relevance of beliefs about collective 
outcomes, our findings that self-serving biases in belief formation extend to collective settings 
and that markets do not seem to substantially mitigate these biases are important.  
The next section provides a detailed description of the design of our study. In Section 3, 
we present our results. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
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2. Study design 
Our design builds on the framework of Möbius et al. (2017). In each round of the experiment, 
individuals, or groups, first compete by performing a task and then submit beliefs about their 
relative performance in this task. Next, they receive a noisy signal about their relative 
performance and submit their updated beliefs. The above steps are repeated in four rounds.5  
This context allows us to investigate both overconfidence and updating behavior in 
response to good and bad signals. To study how overconfidence and biased information 
processing differ for individual and group outcomes, we manipulate whether the task and beliefs 
are about individual performance or collective performance. We also conduct an additional 
treatment in which we introduce a market to study how this institution influences the formation 
of collective beliefs. 
2.1 The Task 
At the beginning of the experiment, directly after groups are formed (in the Collective and 
Market conditions), each individual/group is randomly matched with another individual/group. 
This pairing is constant across the four rounds.  
Across all treatment conditions (described below) and rounds of the experiment, subjects 
are first asked to work on solving a knapsack problem (Murawski and Bossaerts, 2016; Tang, et 
al., 2017) in a limited amount of time. Knapsack problems consist of deciding which objects in a 
finite set to select (i.e., to “put into the knapsack”). Each object has a value and a weight. The 
goal is to choose the set of objects that maximize the total value subject to some weight 
constraint: 






where I is the total number of objects, vi  is the value of object i, wi is the weight of object i and C 
is the weight constraint. Finding the optimal solution is a combinatorial optimization problem 
that has no single solution approach. More formally, these problems are NP-hard, which means 
that no know algorithm solves these problems in an efficient manner as the size of the problem 
increases.6 Practically, that means that there is no approach that ensures an optimal solution of 
																																																								
5 In the design of Möbius et al. (2017), subjects receive multiple signals for each task and therefore repeatedly update their 
beliefs. We opt for only one belief update per task to decrease the number of markets in the Market condition.   
6 Efficient means that computational time increases in polynomial time as the size of the problem increases. 
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these problems across all instances. For example, the intuitive approach of calculating the 
value/weight ratio of each object and then inserting objects into the knapsack in descending order 
until the weight capacity is reached results in an optimal solution in some but not all problem 
instances.  
The experiment introduced knapsack problems with differing levels of difficulty in 
random order across rounds. We chose these knapsack problems for several reasons. First, they 
are easy to explain to subjects. Second, knapsack problems allow a group of subjects to 
collaborate electronically. Finally, given that there is no global solution approach and many 
possible permutations, it is difficult for subjects to verify whether they have a “correct” answer. 
If, instead, subjects could easily verify whether they submitted an optimal response, beliefs 
regarding relative performance would be less clear in such cases. Finally, each instance of the 
problem presents a new challenge in which earlier solutions may not be helpful, meaning that 
there is some independence of performance across rounds.  
In the Individual condition, subjects work independently on the knapsack problem on 
their computer screen. They observe the parameters for that specific problem, can click on items 
to include in the knapsack and observe the score of their current selection. The interface also 
records the best solution found thus far, allowing subjects to easily implement this solution. 
Figure C1 in the Appendix provides an example of the interface employed when working on the 
task. 
In both the Collective and Market conditions, subjects are randomly organized into 
groups of six and work jointly on one knapsack problem, submitting one final solution for the 
group. Subjects see the current knapsack problem on their screen and can search for solutions. 
When they find a promising solution, they can share it with the other members of their group. 
Subjects observe the best solution found yet by any of their group members. To facilitate 
collaboration, subjects can communicate via a chat interface with their teammates. This 
communication includes free text as well as proposed solutions to the knapsack problem. Figure 
C2 in the Appendix provides an example of the interface employed when solving the task. Group 
composition is constant across the four rounds. The only difference between the Collective and 
the Market conditions is the information subjects receive between rounds, which we explain 
later.  
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Across all conditions, subjects get 90 seconds to initially inspect the knapsack problem 
for that round and 60 additional seconds to try out different solutions. In the Collective and 
Market conditions, subjects can communicate with their group members during the full 150 
seconds. 
2.2 Incentives, beliefs and markets 
In the Individual condition, participants who provide a better solution than their matched 
counterpart receive 40 CHF (≈ $40) while those with the inferior solution receive 10 CHF. 
Given the discrete nature of the solution, ties are resolved by observing the time it took to submit 
the final (best) solution. The Collective and Market conditions generate the same per-person 
payoffs from providing an inferior or a better solution in the knapsack problem: the group that 
provides the better solution receives 240 CHF (paid in equal shares to each member) while the 
group with the inferior solution receives 60 CHF.  
Next, subjects are asked to report their belief, p (on a scale of 0-100), that their solution is 
better than that of the matched individual or group. We incentivize accuracy with a quadratic 
scoring rule:7 





where 𝟏(𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) equals 1 if a subject’s solution is better in that round (and 0 otherwise) and p is 
the probability estimate.  
After submitting the first confidence report, subjects receive a signal about their relative 
performance in that round. In the Individual condition, the signal ({𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒}) is 
drawn from a distribution that reveals the true relative performance in that round with 2/3 
probability and gives the wrong relative performance with 1/3 probability. The same signal is 
drawn, at the group level, in both the Collective and Market conditions; all members of a group 
receive the same signal.8  
																																																								
7 Möbius et al. (2017) and the subsequent literature use the probabilistic crossover method (also called matching probabilities) to 
incentivize the belief elicitation. This method, however, potentially depends on ambiguity attitudes and the ambiguity of the 
event evaluated (see e.g. Baillon, Cabantous and Wakker, 2012). In our experiment, we worried about potential differences 
between treatment conditions in ambiguity about relative performance, so we therefore chose a quadratic scoring rule instead. 
This rule is also easy to explain to participants. 
8 We explain to subjects that there is an urn with 3 balls: 2 balls correspond to the participant (group) that won and 1 ball 
corresponds to the participant (group) that lost. We explain that 1 ball is drawn from the urn, and both the subject (group), and the 
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In the Market condition, subjects next participate in a double-auction asset market.9 Each 
group forms an independent market; that is, subjects trade assets within their group. The group 
trades a single Arrow-Debreu security that pays off 2 CHF if the group obtained the better 
knapsack solution in that round and 0 CHF otherwise. Subjects’ security endowments in the 
market session are designed to add up to zero, as to neutralize aggregate incentive effects from 
the market.10 Figure C3 in the Appendix provides an example of the market interface.  
In all treatment conditions, after observing the additional feedback (and after 
participating in the market in the Market condition) and before proceeding to the next round, 
subjects are asked to submit an additional confidence report (posterior beliefs) in the same 
format as their initial confidence report. The payment scheme for the second confidence report is 
the same as the first one.  
After playing all four rounds we measure risk-aversion, using the method by Gneezy and 
Potters (1997)—subjects receive an initial 3 CHF balance and decide how much of it to invest in 
a project that generates 6 times the investment with 25 percent probability and loses the 
investment with 75 percent probability. We also measure ambiguity attitudes by eliciting the 
certainty equivalent of a bet that pays 5 CHF if a color of the participant’s choice (red or black) 
is drawn from an urn that consists of 10 red and black balls of unknown composition. To 
measure ambiguity aversion, we compare this certainty equivalent with the certainty equivalent 
of a lottery that pays 5 CHF with a probability of 50 percent. Finally, subjects fill out a survey 
eliciting various demographic characteristics. 
To determine payments, we draw one of the four rounds and pay for the relative 
performance in that round’s knapsack problem. Then a different round is randomly selected. One 
of the two belief estimates in this round is randomly drawn to count for the payment. Finally, in 
the Market condition, a third and different round is randomly selected to count for the market 
payment. This procedure limits possibilities for hedging within a round. In addition to these 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“matched subject” (“matched group”) observe to which person (group) this ball corresponds. This means that so the subject and 
the “matched subject” receive perfectly negative correlated signals about their own relative performance. 
9 In the Market condition, we only measure beliefs before the signal and after the market stage, but not between these two stages. 
We do so to keep the treatment conditions as similar as possible. 
10 In each round and market, three randomly drawn subjects start with 5 assets and 0 CHF cash, the three other subjects start with 
-5 assets and 10 CHF cash. In addition, each subject receives a loan of 6 CHF for trading that has to be paid back. We allow short 
selling. Trading is restricted in that trades are not allowed if they result in a negative cash balance, or if they potentially generate 
losses of more than the loan received. 
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payments, subjects receive all their payoffs from the tasks eliciting risk aversion and ambiguity 
attitudes. 
Subjects were informed about the full procedure before the experiment started.  
2.3 Procedures  
Subjects were students from the joint subject pool of the University of Zurich and the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology (ETH). The experiment was programmed in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited with hroot (Bock et al., 2014).  
At the beginning of a session, subjects received detailed instructions on knapsack 
problems, on the procedures for performing the task, on how payments would be determined, 
and, in the Market condition, on the market. All instructions were delivered both on paper and 
with pre-recorded audio files. Instructions and materials are available in Appendix D.11 To 
ensure that subjects understood the instructions, they answered comprehension questions before 
the start of the experiment. Subjects also saw a trial knapsack problem to familiarize them with 
the structure of the problem and the solution interface. To familiarize subjects with the market 
interface in the Market condition, they participated in a trial market. In this trial market, subject 
traded assets whose payoffs depended on a virtual coin flip. We did not incentivize this trial 
period.	
We collected data from a total of 324 subjects, 48 subjects in the Individual condition, 
144 subjects in the Collective condition, and 132 subjects in the Market condition. The sessions 
lasted about 75 minutes in the Individual and Collective conditions and 120 minutes in the 
Market condition. Average earnings were CHF 44.46 (sd=CHF 17.71), or around US$45. 
2.4 Econometric specification 
To investigate biases in belief updating, we compare the observed updating to the Bayesian 
benchmark. Previous studies on processing of ego-relevant information focus on two deviations 
from Bayesian updating: asymmetric updating and conservatism. Asymmetric updating means 
that people react more strongly to positive than negative signals, a mechanism facilitating the 
preservation of positive self-image. Conservatism means that people react less strongly to the 
signals than predicted by Bayes’ rule. We follow Möbius et al. (2017) and the subsequent 
																																																								
11 We follow the use of voice recordings to deliver instructions, as in Bartling, Engl and Weber (2015). This, combined with 
standardized instructions and computerized interfaces, ensures highly replicable environments across sessions.  
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literature by estimating the following regression model, a linearized version of Bayes’ rule (see 
also Grether, 1980; Augenblick and Rabin, 2021):  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟! = 𝛿!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟! + 𝛽!,!𝜆!𝟏 𝑠! = 𝑛𝑒𝑔. + 𝛽!,!𝜆!𝟏 𝑠! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠. + 𝜀!      (1) 
where 𝑡 denotes the treatment condition (Individual, Collective or Market), 𝟏(𝑠! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠. ) is an 
indicator of a positive signal, and 𝜆! = −𝜆! = ln(2) is the log likelihood ratio of a positive 
signal. Note that  𝛿! measures the weight placed on prior beliefs, and 𝛽!,! and 𝛽!,! measures how 
strongly subjects react to negative and positive signals, respectively. If subjects update according 
to Bayes’ rule, then 𝛿! = 𝛽!,! = 𝛽!,! = 1. Asymmetric updating favoring a positive self-image is 
defined as 𝛽!,! < 𝛽!,! and conservatism as 𝛽!,! ,𝛽!,! < 1. Finally, 𝛿! < 1 can be interpreted as 
base-rate neglect and 𝛿! > 1 as confirmation bias (Augenblick and Rabin, 2021). We exclude 
observations where subjects update in the wrong direction. We discuss such mistakes in belief 
updating in the next section. 
3. Results 
We first briefly assess the degree to which subjects’ updating process represents an at least 
partially sensible response to information. We then discuss overconfidence in priors and study 
biases in belief updating for individual outcomes, replicating earlier work. Next, we address the 
main questions of this paper: Do people update beliefs about collective outcomes in a self-
serving way? And, if so, do such biases in beliefs about collective outcomes differ from biases 
for individual outcomes? In the last section, we discuss the results of the Market condition.12 
3.1 Updating mistakes 
In this section, we discuss mistakes in belief updating, in particular updates in the wrong 
direction. We also investigate whether participants change their beliefs in response to the 
																																																								
12 Since actual performance on the knapsack problems is not our focus, we do not analyze this measure in detail. In the Individual 
condition, subjects successfully find the optimal solution to the knapsack problem in 29.2% of all cases. The success rate is lower 
than in Murawski and Bossaerts (2016). This difference is likely due to subjects having less time to solve the knapsack problem 
in our experiment (up to 90s time difference). Groups’ success rates are 73.7% in the Collective condition, and 78.4% in the 
Market condition. In the Collective and Market conditions, each subject sent on average 1.1 messages per round while working 
on the task.  
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(informative) signal.13 Updating mistakes are indicators of loss of experimental control that can 
be due, for example, to unclear instructions.  
In the Collective condition, 17.9% of subjects update at least once in the wrong direction 
and a total of 6.7% of the updating decisions go in the wrong direction. Moreover, subjects do 
not update their beliefs in response to the signal in 25.6% of all updating decisions and 4.2% of 
subjects do not update their beliefs in any of the four rounds. We find similar frequencies in the 
Individual condition (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Previous studies (e.g., Möbius et al, 2017) 
find more frequent updating mistakes, indicating the high data quality of our study.  
Subjects in the Market condition receive multiple signals: the signal from the urn and 
signals from the market. It is therefore less clear what is a parsimonious definition of incorrect 
updating.14 We consider an update as a mistake if the subject increases her belief in response to a 
negative signal from both the urn and the market, or if the subject decreases her belief in 
response to a positive signal from both the urn and the market.15 Mistakes are somewhat more 
common in the Market condition than in the other treatment conditions: 23.5% of subjects update 
at least once in the wrong direction and 8.3% of subjects do not update their beliefs in any of the 
four rounds (see Table A1 in the Appendix). This is likely due to the updating decision being 
more complicated in the Market condition.  
3.2 Priors: Confidence about individual and collective outcomes 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of prior beliefs about winning the competition for all 
three treatment conditions. On average, the prior belief is 57.9% in the Collective condition, 
56.6% in the Individual condition and 59.3% in the Market condition.16 In each condition, 
average beliefs are statistically higher than 50% (p-value<0.01), indicating moderate degrees of 
overconfidence.17 Biases do not differ between treatment conditions: Subjects exhibit similar 
																																																								
13 On average, subjects react to the signal. Table 2 shows that the posterior beliefs are substantially and significantly lower for 
subjects who receive a positive signal compared to subjects who receive a negative signal. 
14 Suppose, for example, that a subject first receives a negative signal, but the market price reflects more confidence than this 
subject’s prior. As the subject receives a negative signal from the urn, and a positive signal from the market, the subject might 
increase or decrease her belief.  
15 To define the market signal, we calculate the price of the last 10 trades, divided by 2. This is a measure of the optimism 
manifested in the market price. If this normalized price is higher than a subject’s prior, it is considered a positive market signal 
for the subject; if the price is lower than the prior, it is considered a negative market signal for the subject. 
16 Priors do not differ significantly between rounds nor between knapsack problems. Prior beliefs are predictive of actual relative 
performance: a one percentage point higher belief translates into a 0.15% percentage point higher probability to actually be better 
(p-value=0.027). 
17 In the following analysis, standard errors are clustered on the matched-individual level (the two matched individuals form a 
cluster) in the Individual condition and on the matched-group level (the two matched groups form a cluster) in the Collective and 
Market conditions. 
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levels of confidence about collective and individual outcomes. We conclude that, in the 
aggregate, overconfidence is as prevalent for collective outcomes as for individual outcomes. 
 
Figure 1: Distributions of prior beliefs by condition 
 
 
3.3 Updating beliefs about individual outcomes 
Before we study how participants update beliefs about collective outcomes, we investigate 
whether our results replicate earlier work on self-serving biases in updating beliefs about 
individual outcomes. Figure 2 shows the mean absolute belief update conditional on the prior 
and the signal for the Individual condition, using a similar approach to Möbius et al. (2017). The 
figure compares subjects who received a positive signal and had a prior belief 𝜇 with subjects 
who received a negative signal and had a prior belief of 1− 𝜇. If participants are Bayesians, the 
absolute magnitude of the belief update should be the same for both groups. If people update 
asymmetrically, however, the belief update should be larger for positive signals than for negative 
signals. For intermediate priors, we find that subjects update asymmetrically. For the very 
extreme prior category 0-9%, we find that subjects react more strongly to negative than to 
























statistically significantly different from zero. If we compare the mean absolute belief revision 
with the Bayesian benchmark (red crosses), we see that subjects with low priors overreact to the 
signal, in particular if they receive a good signal. Subjects with intermediate priors tend to be 
conservative, particularly when they receive a negative signal.  
 
Figure 2: Asymmetric updating in the Individual condition 
 
Mean absolute belief revisions by decile of prior belief in being of type equal to the signal received (following Möbius et al., 
2017). + indicates the rational benchmark of Bayesian updating. Observations where people updated in the wrong direction are 
excluded. The numbers on top of the bars indicate p-values, testing whether the update in response to the negative and positive 
signals is equal. 
 
The first column of Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients from model (1) for the 
Individual condition.18 We find evidence for base-rate neglect (𝛿!"#$%$#&'( < 1, p-value<0.01). 
Moreover, we find that subjects react conservatively in response to negative signals 
(𝛽!,!"#$%$#&'(<1, p-value=0.014). For positive signals, however, behavior corresponds to the 
Bayesian benchmark (𝛽!,!"#$%$#&'( is close to 1). Hence, subjects put more weight on positive 
signals than negative signals; that is, they update asymmetrically (p-value=0.003). Given that the 
non-parametric analysis revealed different updating patterns for extreme priors, we also report 
																																																								
18 Note that the logit does not exist for the priors at the boundary (0 and 100). We follow the previous literature by excluding 






































































estimated coefficients when restricting the sample to observations with priors in [20,80]. 
Estimates are similar (see Table 1, column 4). Table A2 in the Appendix demonstrates that the 
results are robust to other sample restrictions.  
Comparing our estimates to previous studies, we find similar degrees of conservatism as 
Schwardmann and Van der Weele (2020) and Coutts (2019). However, unlike some earlier 
replications of Möbius et al. (2017) (see Buser et al., 2018; Schwardmann and Van der Weele, 
2020; Coutts, 2019) we find robust evidence of asymmetric updating.19 
 
Table 1: Updating behavior in Individual and Collective conditions 
Subsample: Priors in (0,100) Priors in [20,80] 





































N 160 475  159 459  
p(𝜹𝒕 == 𝟏) 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.001  
p(𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝟏) 0.014 0.000  0.004 0.000  
p(𝜷𝑯,𝒕 == 𝟏) 0.243 0.045  0.391 0.072  
p(𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝜷𝑯,𝒕) 0.003 0.154  0.005 0.000  
 
Note: Estimated coefficients of model (1). Priors in (0,100): Observations where people updated in the wrong direction or with a 
prior=0 or =100 are excluded. Priors in [20,80]: Observations where people updated in the wrong direction or with a prior<20 
or >80 are excluded. Standard errors clustered at matched-individual/group level; Standard errors in parentheses; Coefficient is 
significantly different from 1 (Bayesian benchmark) at * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. p(H) gives the p-value for 
testing hypothesis H.  
 
 
3.4 Updating beliefs about collective outcomes 
Do these biases in the formation of beliefs about individual outcomes extend to beliefs about 
collective outcomes? In the following, we replicate the above analysis for the Collective 
condition. Figure 3 illustrates the mean absolute belief revision for the Collective condition, in a 
manner similar to Figure 2. We find a similar pattern as in the Individual condition: subjects with 




19 Our study differs in some aspects from the previous studies: subjects update their prior only once in each round, and we use a 
different task (the knapsack task). 
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Figure 3: Asymmetric updating in the Collective condition 
 
Mean absolute belief revisions by decile of prior belief in being of type equal to the signal received (following Möbius et al., 
2017). + indicates the rational benchmark of Bayesian updating. Observations where people updated in the wrong direction are 
excluded. The number on top of the bars indicate p-values. 
 
Table 1, columns 2 and 5, give the parameter estimates of model (1) for the Collective 
condition. As in the Individual condition, we find base-rate neglect, conservatism and asymmetry 
in belief updating. However, the difference between 𝛽!,!"#$% and 𝛽!,!"#$% is only statistically 
significant if we exclude observations with extreme priors (see Table A2 in the Appendix for 
different sample restrictions). 
Columns 3 and 6 compare estimates between the Collective and the Individual 
conditions. There is some evidence for treatment differences in updating: subjects put slightly 
less weight on positive signals in the Collective condition compared to the Individual condition 
(p-value=0.029, entire sample). However, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis that all three 
coefficients are the same across the treatment conditions (p-value=0.159).  
Instead of comparing individual belief updating, we can also compare average posteriors 
between treatment conditions. We do this in Table 2. In line with our analysis of individual belief 
updating, we do not find substantial differences in aggregate beliefs between the Individual and 






































































the Collective condition are more confident than subjects in the Individual condition (p-
value=0.09). However, we can not reject the joint hypothesis that both differences are zero (p-
value=0.12). We therefore conclude that biased information processing exists for beliefs about 
collective outcomes in a manner similar to how they occur for individual outcomes. 
 





Market (M) Difference  
I and C 
Difference 









-2.80*   
(1.52)     



























Note: Standard errors clustered at matched-individual/group level; Standard errors in parentheses;  
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
 
3.5 Market condition 
In this section we analyze behavior in the Market condition.20 The first row of Table 3 shows the 
trading volume. Subjects interacted frequently in the markets; on average, a subject traded about 
4 assets per market round. Trading reflects subjects’ beliefs about their group’s performance: at 
the end of the market round, more optimistic subjects owned more assets than less optimistic 
subjects (see Table A3 in the Appendix). The trading volume is independent of the group’s 
signal. 
The second row of Table 3 gives the average market prices conditional on the signal.21 
The price is normalized such that a risk-neutral trader would buy the asset if she believed that the 
probability of winning the competition was higher than the normalized price, and she would sell 
the asset if she believed that it was lower than the price. Market prices incorporate signals: the 
average market price is substantially higher, by 16.5, if participants receive a positive signal. 
																																																								
20 Behavior in the trial market round suggests that subjects understand how the market works. In the trial market round, subjects 
trade a risky asset (not incentivized), which is not connected to subjects’ self-images. Prices in this trial market are close to CHF 
1.00, the equilibrium prediction: the average price is CHF 1.10 and the median price is CHF 1.00. 
21 Figure A1 in the Appendix gives the cumulative distributions for market prices. Figure A2 shows average market prices for the 
four rounds separately; prices do not substantially differ between rounds. Figure A3 in the Appendix gives the price development 
over trading rounds.  
	 17 
The third row of Table 3 shows the objective expected value of the assets conditional on 
the signal.22 Average prices are substantially higher than the expected value, in particular for 
markets that received a negative signal. Prices express even more optimism than the posterior 
beliefs documented in the Collective condition (69.5 for positive signals and 46.5 for negative 
signals, see Table 2), an estimate for what the beliefs in the Market condition might have been 
before subjects start trading. These high prices are consistent with evidence that people are 
reluctant to bet against the occurrence of desired outcomes (Seybert and Bloomfield, 2009; 
Morewedge, Tang and Larrick, 2018).  
 








Number of assets traded  












Expected value of asset 66.7 33.3  
Note: Price asset normalized is the average market price for the last 10 trades, divided by 2 
(normalized). Expected value of asset is the normalized expected value of the asset = 2/3*200/2 resp. 
1/3*200/2. 
 
Are the individual biases that we observe in the Collective condition mitigated by the 
collective judgment produced in markets? Or, does the collective over-optimism expressed in 
market prices bias participants’ beliefs even more?23 To study the impact of the market on 
subjects’ beliefs, we estimate the parameters of model (1) for the Market condition; we regress 
subjects’ posteriors (that is, their beliefs after they observed signals and then interacted in the 
market) on their priors and the signal from the urn.24 We then compare the resulting coefficients 
to the Collective condition.25 Table 4 gives the estimates. We also report estimates for the sample 
restricted to observations with a prior in [20,80].  
																																																								
22 The average empirical value of the assets is almost the same as the expected value. 
23 After controlling for the groups’ signals, the market price is not predictive of winning the competition (p-value=0.982). This 
suggests that, from a normative point of view, subjects should not react to the market prices. 
24 We therefore do not explicitly study how subjects incorporate market signals, such as prices, in their updating behavior. 
Instead, we estimate a similar model as for the Collective condition. This approach allows us to study whether the market 
interaction affects belief updating. In Appendix B, we incorporate market signals into model (1) and provide the corresponding 
estimates. 
25 Figure A4 in the Appendix replicates Figure 2, that is, the non-parametric analysis, for the Market condition. We find a similar 
pattern as in the Collective condition. 
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Table 4: Updating behavior in Market condition 
Subsample: Priors in (0,100) Priors in [20,80] 








































N 475 453  459 441  
p-value 𝜹𝒕 == 𝟏 0.000 0.026  0.001 0.000  
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.000  
p-value 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.045 0.007  0.072 0.004  
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.154 0.225  0.000 0.000  
 
Note: Estimated coefficients of model (1). Priors in (0,100): Observations where people updated in the wrong direction or with a 
prior=0 or =100 are excluded. Priors in [20,80]: Observations where people updated in the wrong direction or with a prior<20 
or >80 are excluded. Standard errors clustered at matched-individual/group level; Standard errors in parentheses; Coefficient is 
significantly different from 1 at * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
 
For both the full and the restricted samples, we can reject the joint hypothesis that all 
three estimates are the same across the Market and Collective conditions (p-value=0.013 and p-
value=0.002, respectively). For subjects with intermediate priors, we find a larger degree of 
base-rate neglect in the Market condition than in the Collective condition (𝛿!"#$%& < 𝛿!"#$%). A 
potential explanation is that subjects update their beliefs not only in response to the signal from 
the urn but also in response to signals from the markets. These additional updates reduce the 
weight of the initial prior (see Appendix B). 
Compared with the Collective condition, subjects in the Market condition react less to 
negative signals. For intermediate priors, the difference in 𝛽!,! is statistically significant at the 
1%-level. This finding is robust to different sample restrictions (see Table A4 in the Appendix). 
After receiving a bad signal, the optimism reflected in market prices seems to help subjects to 
partly restore their confidence.26 We do not find a treatment difference for positive signals. This 
potentially reflects the fact that the assets exhibit less overpricing after receiving a positive 
signal.  
Instead of comparing individual belief updating, we can also compare average posteriors 
between treatment conditions. We do this in Table 2. The average posterior of subjects who 
																																																								
26 We find some evidence that subjects incorporated market signals in their beliefs (see Appendix B for details). 
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received a positive signal is 6.3 percentage points lower than the posterior in the Collective 
condition (p-value=0.005). There is no treatment difference for subjects who received a negative 
signal. At first glance, this seems to be in contradiction with the finding that individual updating 
differs only in response to negative signals (𝛽!,!), not in response to positive signals (𝛽!,!). 
However, these two findings can be explained by the fact that we observe a second treatment 
effect, a stronger degree of base-rate neglect in the Market condition.  
We conclude that the market does not mitigate biases in belief formation regarding 
collective outcomes. If anything, we find that biases are exacerbated: compared to the Collective 
condition, subjects underreact even more to negative signals in the Market condition. 
4. Conclusion 
We explore whether over-optimism and self-serving biases in information processing exist for 
collective outcomes in a manner similar to how they occur for individual outcomes. We first 
show that subjects exhibit such biases for beliefs about individual outcomes: subjects are 
overconfident and update their beliefs asymmetrically in response to new information. That is, 
they put more weight on good news than on bad news. This replicates patterns found in many—
but not all—previous studies that investigate this question. 
We then investigate biases in beliefs about collective outcomes. As with beliefs about 
individual outcomes, subjects also exhibit self-serving beliefs about collective outcomes, and 
magnitudes are remarkably similar to those for biases about individual outcomes. Thus, our first 
main novel contribution is to document that the tendency to overweight positive information 
more than negative information, i.e., asymmetric updating, also extends to the formation of 
beliefs about collective outcomes. Given the importance of beliefs about such outcomes—from 
macroeconomic performance to firm profitability—for a wide variety of economic behaviors, 
this observation is important. 
We also investigate how such belief formation is influenced by the presence of an 
information aggregation institution, specifically, a market. Collective self-delusion potentially 
plays an important role for market outcomes. However, it has been argued that markets can 
mitigate individual biases. We find that the market institution, if anything, exacerbates biases. 
We also observe that market prices depart substantially from fundamentals, in manner consistent 
with positive self-delusion. Thus, our findings suggest that, rather than reducing the tendency to 
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engage in self-serving information processing, aggregating beliefs through an institution such as 
a market may have the opposite effect. This is consistent with the observation that many 
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Appendix A: Additional results 
 
Table A1: Updating mistakes 
 Individual  Collective  Market Previous 
studies 
percent no update 
 
28.1 25.6 32.0 36 (M); 41 (C) 
percent subjects  
never update 
2.1 4.2 8.3 16 (M) 
percent updates  
wrong direction 
3.6 6.7 8.1 10 (M,B); 4.8 
(C) 
percent subjects with at 
least one update wrong 
direction 
12.5 17.9 23.5 27 (M) 
 
Notes: “no update” is defined as the prior being equal to the posterior; “update in the wrong direction” is defined as a negative 
update in response to a positive signal or a positive update in response to a negative signal for the Individual and Collective 
condition. For the Market condition, it is defined as a negative update in response to both, a positive signal and a “positive 
market signal” (average price of the last 10 trades/2 > prior) or a positive update in response to both, a negative signal and a 
“negative market signal” (average price of the last 10 trades/2 < prior). Previous studies gives the percentages from previos 
studies: (C) refers to Coutts (2019), (B) refers to Buser et al. (2018) and (M) refers to Möbius et al. (2017). 
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 Individual condition 
𝜹𝒕 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.542*** 0.575*** 0.871 0.650*** 0.553*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.120) (0.150) (0.155) (0.101) (0.135) 
𝜷𝑳,𝒕 0.671** 0.671** 0.642*** 0.597*** 0.609*** 0.703** 0.669*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.112) (0.110) (0.109) (0.126) (0.114) 
𝜷𝑯,𝒕 1.133 1.133 1.090 1.043 0.951 1.231* 1.175 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.102) (0.103) (0.098) (0.115) (0.109) 
N 160 160 159 139 117 142 141 
p-value 𝜹𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0093 0.4117 0.0021 0.0031 
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0136 0.0136 0.0040 0.0013 0.0015 0.0269 0.0078 
p-value 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.2430 0.2430 0.3905 0.6802 0.6202 0.0568 0.1206 
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.0033 0.0033 0.0048 0.0084 0.0138 0.0024 0.0040 
 Collective condition 
𝜹𝒕 0.710*** 0.597*** 0.642*** 0.598*** 0.619*** 0.706*** 0.629*** 
 (0.057) (0.065) (0.075) (0.071) (0.107) (0.072) (0.089) 
𝜷𝑳,𝒕 0.678*** 0.618*** 0.597*** 0.558*** 0.528*** 0.735*** 0.643*** 
 (0.054) (0.039) (0.041) (0.048) (0.058) (0.081) (0.039) 
𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.834** 0.900* 0.881* 0.854*** 0.812*** 0.901 0.960 
 (0.073) (0.049) (0.060) (0.045) (0.046) (0.081) (0.065) 
N 475 473 459 414 338 394 380 
p-value 𝜹𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0045 0.0018 0.0016 
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 
p-value 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0449 0.0643 0.0715 0.0077 0.0019 0.2481 0.5454 
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.1536 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.2626 0.0007 
 Difference 
Difference 𝜹𝒕 -0.082 0.030 -0.100 -0.023 0.252 -0.057 -0.076 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.140) (0.164) (0.186) (0.122) (0.159) 
Difference 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 -0.006 0.053 0.045 0.040 0.081 -0.032 0.026 
 (0.133) (0.128) (0.118) (0.118) (0.122) (0.147) (0.119) 
Difference 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.299** 0.233* 0.209* 0.189* 0.139 0.331** 0.215* 
 (0.131) (0.120) (0.117) (0.111) (0.107) (0.139) (0.125) 
p-value asym. 0.083 0.228 0.284 0.355 0.679 0.086 0.274 
p-value joint test 0.159 0.220 0.373 0.410 0.452 0.100 0.401 
 
Note: Estimated coefficients of model (1). Observations where people updated in the wrong direction or with a prior of 0 percent 
of 100 percent are excluded are excluded. “Priors in [10,90]” means that the sample is restricted to observations with a prior in 
between 10 percent and 90 percent. Möbius subs. restricts the sample to subjects that never updated in the wrong direction (in 
the 4 rounds) and to subjects who updated their beliefs at least once (the subsample explored in Möbius et al. (2017)). Möbius 
subs. 2 restricts Möbius subsample to observations with a prior in [20,80]. “p-value asym.” is the p-value from the test on 
whether there is a difference in asymmetric updating (H0: 𝛽!,!"#$% − 𝛽!,!"#$% = 𝛽!,!"#$%$#&'( − 𝛽!,!"#$%$#&'().  “p-value joint 
test” is the p-value from a joint test that 𝛿!, 𝛽!,! and 𝛽!,! do not differ between the two treatment conditions (F-test). Standard 





Table A3: Relationship between beliefs and trading in the market 
  
 
Notes: For each round and group, subjects are ranked according to their posterior belief with rank=1 being the least optimistic 
subject in the group. We then correlate the rank with the number of assets the participant owns at the end of the market period. 
The total number of assets sum up to 0 by design. Standard errors clustered at matched-group level; Standard errors in 
parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
  








Rank Average number assets 





6 (most optimistic) 1.64 
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 Collective condition 
𝜹𝒕 0.710*** 0.597*** 0.642*** 0.598*** 0.619*** 0.706*** 0.629*** 
 (0.057) (0.065) (0.075) (0.071) (0.107) (0.072) (0.089) 
𝜷𝑳,𝒕 0.678*** 0.618*** 0.597*** 0.558*** 0.528*** 0.735*** 0.643*** 
 (0.054) (0.039) (0.041) (0.048) (0.058) (0.081) (0.039) 
𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.834** 0.900* 0.881* 0.854*** 0.812*** 0.901 0.960 
 (0.073) (0.049) (0.060) (0.045) (0.046) (0.081) (0.065) 
N 475 473 459 414 338 394 380 
 Market condition 
𝜹𝒕 0.643** 0.409*** 0.455*** 0.403*** 0.387*** 0.514*** 0.461*** 
 (0.137) (0.046) (0.050) (0.064) (0.071) (0.076) (0.067) 
𝜷𝑳,𝒕 0.411*** 0.288*** 0.317*** 0.304*** 0.239*** 0.415*** 0.406*** 
 (0.130) (0.075) (0.075) (0.081) (0.082) (0.094) (0.089) 
𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.679*** 0.798*** 0.813*** 0.787*** 0.735*** 0.878* 0.889 
 (0.095) (0.046) (0.050) (0.061) (0.063) (0.059) (0.062) 
N 453 448 441 394 303 338 334 
p-value 𝜹𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0261 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
p-value 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 == 𝟏 0.0069 0.0013 0.0040 0.0061 0.0017 0.0655 0.1013 
p-value 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 == 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.2252 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 
 Difference 
Difference 𝜹𝒕 0.067 0.188** 0.187** 0.195** 0.232* 0.193* 0.168 
 (0.145) (0.077) (0.089) (0.094) (0.126) (0.102) (0.109) 
Difference 𝜷𝑳,𝒕 0.267* 0.330*** 0.280*** 0.253** 0.289*** 0.319** 0.236** 
 (0.137) (0.083) (0.083) (0.092) (0.098) (0.121) (0.095) 
Difference 𝜷𝑯,𝒕 0.155 0.102 0.068 0.067 0.077 0.022 0.071 
 (0.117) (0.065) (0.076) (0.074) (0.076) (0.098) (0.087) 
p-value asym. 0.624 0.027 0.039 0.102 0.067 0.082 0.135 
p-value joint test 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.020 0.065 0.0614 
 
Note: Estimated coefficients of model (1). Observations where people updated in the wrong direction or with a prior of 0 percent 
of 100 percent are excluded are excluded. “Priors in [10,90]” means that the sample is restricted to observations with a prior in 
between 10 percent and 90 percent. Möbius subs. restricts the sample to subjects that never updated in the wrong direction (in 
the 4 rounds) and to subjects who updated their beliefs at least once. Möbius subs. 2 restricts Möbius subsample to observations 
with a prior in [20,80]. “p-value asym.” is the p-value from the test on whether there is a difference in asymmetric updating (H0: 
𝛽!,!"#$% − 𝛽!,!"#$% = 𝛽!,!"#$%& − 𝛽!,!"#$%&). “p-value joint test” is the p-value from a joint test that 𝛿!, 𝛽!,! and 𝛽!,! do not 
differ between the two treatment conditions (F-test). Standard errors clustered at matched-individual/group level; Standard 




Figure A1: Distribution market price and trading volume 
	  	   
(a) Market price    (b) Trading volume 
Notes: For each market, we calculate the average price of the last 10 trades and the total number of trades. The figures show the 
cumulative distributions of these two variables, conditional on the signal. 
 
Figure A2: Market prices over rounds 
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Figure A3: Development market price over time 
	   	  
(a) Negative signal      (b) Positive signal 
 
Notes: In each market, participants traded for 4 minutes. The figure shows the correlation between asset prices and past time. 
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Figure A4: Asymmetric updating in Market condition 
 
 
Mean absolute belief revisions by decile of prior belief in being of type equal to the signal received (following Möbius et al., 
2017). The number on top of the bars indicate p-values. + indicates the rational benchmark of Bayesian updating. Observations 




































































Appendix B: Updating in the Market condition 
In this Appendix, we adapt the framework introduced in Section 2.4 to the Market condition. In 
particular, we allow the decision makers to update her belief not only in response to the signal 
from the urn, but also in response to the market prices. We assume that there are two possible 
signals from the market, a good signal and a bad signal. The decision maker makes two 
sequential updating decisions. First, she starts with a prior (𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓1), and incorporates the signal 
from the urn, 𝑠!,!, into her belief (𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓2). Second, she starts from the updated belief (𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓2) 
and incorporates the market signal, 𝑠!,!, into her belief (𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓3). We follow Möbius et al. 
(2017) by modeling the updating behavior with a parameterized version of Bayes rule. The first 
belief update is captured by: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓2! = 𝛿!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓1! + 𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑛𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠.  (2) 
where 𝟏(𝑠!,! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠. ) indicates that the signal from the urn was positive, 𝜆!,! = −𝜆!,! = ln(2) 
is the log likelihood ratio of a positive signal from the urn, 𝛿! measures the weight placed on the 
prior belief and  𝛽!,! and 𝛽!,! measures how strong the decision maker react to positive and 
negative signals from the urn. 
The second update is captured by: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓3! = 𝛿!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓2! + 𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑛𝑒𝑔. + 𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! =  𝑝𝑜𝑠.  (3) 
where 𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠.  indicates that the market signal was positive, 𝛿! measures the weight 
placed on the prior belief, 𝛽!,! and 𝛽!,! measures how much weight the decision maker puts on 
the market signal and 𝜆!,! is the log likelihood ratio of a positive market signal given the signal 
from the urn: 
𝜆!,! = ln
Pr 𝑠!,! = 𝑛𝑒𝑔. 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑠!,!
Pr 𝑠!,! =  𝑛𝑒𝑔. 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑠!,!
 
𝜆!,! = ln
Pr 𝑠!,! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠. 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑠!,!
Pr 𝑠!,! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠. 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑠!,!
. 
 
Note that 𝜆!,! is zero if the market signal is perceived as non-informative conditional on 
the signal from the urn. If 𝛽!,!𝜆!,! ≠ 0 (𝛽!,!𝜆!,! ≠ 0), the subject perceives the negative 
(positive) market signals as informative, and incorporates them into her belief. 
	 34 
Combining equations (2) and (3) results in: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓3! = 𝛿!𝛿!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓1! + 𝛿!𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑛𝑒𝑔. + 𝛿!𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠.  
+ 𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑛𝑒𝑔. + 𝛽!,!𝜆!,!𝟏 𝑠!,! = 𝑝𝑜𝑠.          (4) 
 
In the following, we want to test whether subjects react to a positive and negative market 
signals, that is, 𝛽!,!𝜆!,! ≠ 0 and 𝛽!,!𝜆!,! ≠ 0. How should we estimate the parameters of 
model (4)? First, we need a measure for a good and a bad market signal. We use two different 
measures: 
• Measure 1: bad market signal = the normalized average market price27 is lower 
than a subject’s prior belief (𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓1!); good market signal = the normalized 
average market price is higher than a subject’s prior belief. 
• Measure 2: bad market signal = the normalized average market price is lower than 
a subject’s estimated 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓2! (using the parameters estimated in the Collective 
condition); good market signal = the normalized average market price is higher than 
a subject’s estimated 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓2!. 
 
A second challenge is that we can not identify the parameters of interested by only using 
data from the Market condition. We solve this issue by using data from the Collective condition 
to estimate the parameters of equation (2), 𝛿!, 𝛽!,! and 𝛽!,! (see Table 4). Using these estimates 
allows us to identify 𝛿!, 𝛽!,!𝜆!,! and 𝛽!,!𝜆!,!.28 We bootstrap estimation of equation (2) (with 
the Collective condition data) and estimation of equation (3) (with Market condition data) 
together to calculate standard errors. Table B1 gives the estimates.  
We find some evidence that subjects respond to positive market signals by increasing 
their confidence. However, subjects ignore bad market signals. Subjects thus seem to respond 
asymmetrically to market prices in a way that helps them to stay (over-)confident. Another 
interesting finding is that base-rate neglect also applies to the second update, that is, 𝛿! < 1. 
This suggests that a potential explanation for the difference in 𝛿! between the Market and the 
																																																								
27 The normalized market price is the price to which a risk-neutral trader would buy the asset if she believed that the probability 
of winning the competition was higher than the price and would sell the asset if she believed that it was lower than the price. 
28 We can not differentiate between 𝛽! and 𝜆!. However, this is not necessary to test whether subjects react to a positive and 
negative market signals, that is, 𝛽!,!𝜆!,! ≠ 0 and 𝛽!,!𝜆!,! ≠ 0. 
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Collective condition (see Table 4) is that subjects update twice in the Market condition 
(𝛿! = 𝛿!𝛿!) and therefore put less weight on the initial prior. Indeed, multiplying 𝛿! = 0.642 
(as estimated in the Collective condition data, see Table 4) with 𝛿! = 0.747 (as estimated in the 
Market condition data, see Table B1) results in 𝛿! = 0.480 for the sample with a prior belief in 
[20,80]. This is similar to the estimate we find when we estimate the parameters of model (1) in 
the Market condition (see Table 4, 𝛿! = 0.455).  
 


















 Measure 1 
𝜹𝑴 0.825*** 0.708*** 0.747*** 0.740*** 0.707*** 0.907*** 0.771*** 0.785*** 
 (0.124) (0.062) (0.065) (0.073) (0.095) (0.137) (0.085) (0.084) 
𝜷𝑼,𝑳𝝀𝑼,𝑳 -0.057 0.000 -0.017 -0.044 0.053 -0.005 0.016 -0.023 
 (0.088) (0.081) (0.085) (0.079) (0.068) (0.099) (0.096) (0.101) 
𝜷𝑴,𝑯𝝀𝑴,𝑯 0.113 0.141*** 0.129*** 0.118** 0.108** 0.065 0.141** 0.106** 
 (0.078) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.044) (0.082) (0.055)  (0.047) 
N 453 448 441 394 303 377 338 334 
 Measure 2 
𝜹𝑴 0.841*** 0.723*** 0.758*** 0.770*** 0.716*** 0.917*** 0.783*** 0.801*** 
 (0.126) (0.060) (0.064) (0.072) (0.092) (0.138) (0.087) (0.081) 
𝜷𝑼,𝑳𝝀𝑼,𝑳 -0.058 0.024 0.036 -0.016 0.112 -0.014 0.051 0.017 
 (0.134) (0.120) (0.106) (0.102) (0.076) (0.139) (0.137) (0.128) 
𝜷𝑴,𝑯𝝀𝑴,𝑯 0.094 0.119*** 0.101** 0.098** 0.095** 0.060 0.117** 0.080* 
 (0.068) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.071) (0.049) (0.044) 
N 453 448 441 394 303 377 338 334 
 
Note: Estimated coefficients of model (1). Observations where people updated in the wrong direction or with a prior of 0 percent 
of 100 percent are excluded are excluded. “Prior in [10,90]” means that the sample is restricted to observations with a prior in 
between 10 percent and 90 percent. Subsample 1 restricts the sample to subjects that never updated in the wrong direction (in the 
4 rounds). Subsample 2 restricts Subsample 1 to subjects who updated their beliefs at least once (the subsample explored in 
Möbius et al. (2017)). Subsample 3 restricts Subsample 2 to observations with a prior in [20,80]. Bootstrapped standard errors 
(over the two-stage estimation), clustered at matched-individual/group level; Standard errors in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p 
< 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. 
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Appendix C: Additional figures 
Figure C1: Task interface Individual condition 
 
 























Talking	with	 the	 other	participants	 is	 strictly	 forbidden	during	 the	 study.	The	use	 of	 your	
















In	 this	 experiment,	 you	 are	 randomly	 matched	 with	 another	 participant,	 called	 the	 other	































































































1	 3	 Yes	 10	
2	 2	 Yes	 6	
3	 4	 Yes	 11	
1,2	 5	 Yes	 16	
1,3	 7	 No	 -	
2,3	 6	 Yes	 17	













































































































































Thank	 you	 for	 participating.	 During	 this	 experiment,	 you	will	 be	 asked	 to	make	 several	
decisions	 that	 will	 impact	 the	 amount	 of	 money	 that	 you	 will	 earn.	 It	 is	 thus	 very	
important	that	you	read	the	instructions	carefully,	and	that	you	make	your	decisions	with	
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3	 4	 Yes	 11	
1,2	 5	 Yes	 16	
1,3	 7	 No	 -	
2,3	 6	 Yes	 17	






































































































































































Thank	 you	 for	 participating.	 During	 this	 experiment,	 you	will	 be	 asked	 to	make	 several	
decisions	 that	 will	 impact	 the	 amount	 of	 money	 that	 you	 will	 earn.	 It	 is	 thus	 very	
important	that	you	read	the	instructions	carefully,	and	that	you	make	your	decisions	with	














































































































































1	 3	 Yes	 10	
2	 2	 Yes	 6	
3	 4	 Yes	 11	
1,2	 5	 Yes	 16	
1,3	 7	 No	 -	
2,3	 6	 Yes	 17	
1,2,3	 9	 No	 -	
	
The	best	knapsack	is	obtained	by	choosing	items	2	and	3.	This	gives	a	total	value	of	17	
(=6+11)	and	a	total	weight	of	6	(=2+4).		
	
	57	
displays	the	time	remaining.	In	the	table	in	Panel	B,	you	see	the	value	and	the	weight	of	the	
items.	By	checking	the	checkbox	below	an	item,	you	add	this	item	to	your	knapsack.	By	
checking	the	checkbox	again,	you	delete	this	item	from	your	knapsack.	Note	that	during	
the	90-second	interval	during	which	your	group	can	discuss	how	to	tackle	this	task,	you	
cannot	add	items	to	your	knapsack.	The	total	value	and	remaining	capacity	(capacity	
minus	weight	of	the	items	already	in	the	knapsack)	of	your	current	knapsack	are	displayed	
at	the	center	of	Panel	B.	The	button	“Share”	will	be	explained	later.		
	
Your	group’s	best	knapsack		
On	your	screen,	you	will	always	see	the	value,	weight	and	content	of	your	group’s	best	
knapsack.	Remember,	your	group’s	best	knapsack	is	the	knapsack	with	the	most	value	that	
your	group	has	found	so	far.	This	is	illustrated	in	Panel	C	(in	red)	in	“Handout:	overview	
knapsack	screen.”	In	this	example,	the	best	knapsack	found	so	far	in	your	group	consists	
only	of	item	2	and	has	a	value	of	6.	
	
If	you	find	a	knapsack	that	has	more	value,	you	can	click	the	“Share”	button	(in	Panel	B).	
Then,	your	group’s	best	knapsack	will	be	replaced	by	your	current	knapsack.	The	
computer	will	only	replace	the	previous	best	knapsack	if	your	current	knapsack	has	a	
higher	value,	and	its	weight	is	lower	than	(or	equal	to)	the	weight	capacity.	You	can	only	
submit	your	knapsack	during	the	60-second	work	period.	
	
Note	that	your	knapsack	will	not	be	submitted	automatically.	Remember	that	your	group’s	
points	in	a	round	equal	your	group’s	best	knapsack	at	the	end	of	the	work	period.	For	your	
group	to	make	progress,	make	sure	to	share	your	knapsack	solutions	whenever	you	find	a	
better	one.	
Communication	
Throughout	the	process,	you	can	communicate	through	a	chatbox.	You	can	see	the	
chatbox	in	Panel	D	(in	orange)	in	“Handout:	overview	knapsack	screen.”	You	can	write	a	
message	to	the	other	members	of	your	group	by	writing	in	the	blue	input	field	at	the	very	
bottom	of	the	screen.	Click	the	"Enter"	Key	to	send	the	message.	The	identity	of	the	group	
member	sending	a	message	will	be	represented	by	a	number	(1	through	6).		
	
The	“Share”	button	not	only	replaces	the	current	best	knapsack	if	your	knapsack	has	a	
higher	value;	this	button	also	allows	you	to	communicate	any	solutions	you	want	to	share.	
When	you	click	the	"Share"	button,	your	current	knapsack	(value,	weight	and	content)	will	
be	posted	in	the	chatbox,	so	the	other	members	of	your	group	can	see	your	knapsack.	The	
following	message	will	appear	in	the	chatbox:	“I	found	a	knapsack	with	value	of	[VALUE]	
and	weight	[WEIGHT].	I	have	the	following	items	in	my	knapsack:	[CONTENT].”	The	
computer	will	only	allow	you	to	share	your	knapsack	if	its	weight	is	lower	than	(or	equal	
to)	the	weight	capacity.		
	
Trial	period	
Before	proceeding	with	the	rest	of	the	instructions,	you	will	have	some	time	to	familiarize	
yourself	with	the	computer	interface	that	you	will	use	to	solve	knapsack	problems	and	
communicate	with	your	group.	For	this	purpose,	you	will	see	a	trial	knapsack	problem	on	
your	screen,	and	you	will	have	90	seconds	to	test	how	the	interface	works.	This	trial	has	
no	influence	on	your	earnings.	During	the	trial,	you	cannot	communicate	with	the	other	
members	of	your	team,	but	you	can	enter	messages	in	the	chatbox	to	see	how	they	will	
appear.	
	
If	you	have	any	questions	during	this	trial	period,	please	raise	your	hand	and	wait	for	a	
staff	member	to	come	and	help	you.		
	58	
	
Estimate	of	relative	performance	
	
	
Remember	that	in	every	round	of	the	experiment,	after	your	group	works	on	a	solution	to	
the	knapsack	problem,	you	will	provide	an	estimate	of	the	percent	chance	that	your	group	
has	more	points	in	that	round	than	the	other	group.	You	will	enter	the	estimate	by	typing	a	
number	into	an	input	box.	You	can	enter	any	number	between	0	percent	and	100	percent.	
To	give	some	examples	of	what	these	percentages	mean:	
• 50	percent	means	that	you	think	it	is	equally	likely	that	your	group	has	fewer	or	
more	points	than	the	other	group,	
• 0	percent	means	that	you	are	certain	that	your	group	has	fewer	points	than	the	
other	group,	and	
• 100	percent	means	that	you	are	certain	that	your	group	has	more	points	than	
the	other	group.	
	
How	does	accuracy	determine	the	earnings	from	the	estimates?		
We	will	now	explain	to	you	in	detail	how	your	estimates	will	influence	your	earnings	in	
this	experiment.	As	explained	before,	at	the	end	of	the	experiment	one	of	your	estimates	
will	be	randomly	selected	and	your	payment	will	be	determined	according	to	the	accuracy	
of	this	estimate.	Lets	call	your	estimate	of	the	percent	chance	that	your	group	has	more	
points	than	the	other	group,	p.	Your	payment	depends	on	this	estimate	and	on	whether	
your	group	actually	has	fewer	or	more	points	in	the	selected	round:	
	
If	your	group	has	more	points:		 Earnings	(in	CHF)	=	10	-	10	*	(1-	p/100)2		
If	your	group	has	fewer	points:	 Earnings	(in	CHF)		=	10	-	10	*	(p/100)2	
	
The	range	of	your	payoffs	is	from	0	CHF	to	10	CHF.	These	formulas	may	appear	
complicated,	but	what	they	mean	for	you	is	very	simple:	You	can	expect	to	earn	the	most	
money	when	you	honestly	report	your	best	guess	about	the	percent	chance	that	
your	group	has	more	points	and	avoid	making	estimates	that	are	too	high	or	too	
low.	The	following	examples	illustrate	how	these	formulas	make	sure	that	you	will	earn	
more	money	by	making	more	accurate	estimates.		
	
	
	
If	both	groups	have	the	same	number	of	points	in	a	round,	then	the	group	that	used	less	
time	to	find	their	solution	is	considered	to	have	“more	points.”	
Example:	Suppose	that,	at	the	end	of	the	experiment,	you	learn	that	your	group	has	
more	points	than	the	other	group	in	the	chosen	round.		
• Suppose	your	estimate	was	p	=	60	percent.	Then	your	earnings	are		
10	-	10	*	(1	-	60/100)2	CHF	=	8.4	CHF.	
• Suppose	your	estimate	was	p	=	40	percent.	Then	your	earnings	are		
10	-	10	*	(1	-	40/100)2	CHF	=	6.4	CHF.	
	
Suppose	that,	at	the	end	of	the	experiment,	you	learn	that	your	group	has	fewer	points	
than	the	other	group	in	the	chosen	round.		
• Suppose	your	estimate	was	p	=	60	percent.	Then	your	earnings	are		
10	-	10	*	(60/100)2	CHF	=	6.4	CHF.	
• Suppose	your	estimate	was	p	=	40	percent.	Then	your	earnings	are		
10	-	10	*	(40/100)2	CHF	=	8.4	CHF.	
Note	that	making	an	estimate	that	is	too	extreme—of	either	0	percent	or	100	percent—
can	earn	you	10	CHF	if	you	are	right,	but	will	earn	you	0	CHF	if	you	are	wrong.		
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Clues	about	relative	performance	
		
	
In	every	round,	after	you	indicate	your	estimate	the	first	time,	you	will	then	receive	a	clue	
about	whether	or	not	your	group	has	more	points	than	the	other	group	in	that	round.		
	
What	is	a	clue	about	relative	performance?		
The	clue	informs	you	about	your	group’s	relative	performance.	Specifically,	it	gives	you	an	
indication	about	whether	your	group	has	fewer	or	more	points	in	that	round,	to	help	you	
estimate	the	percent	chance	that	your	group	has	more	points.	However,	the	clue	does	not	
perfectly	reveal	which	group	did	better.		
	
In	the	following,	we	explain	how	the	clue	is	generated:	
• There	is	an	Urn	with	3	balls,	determined	as	follows:		
o 2	balls	correspond	to	the	group	with	more	points,	and		
o 1	ball	corresponds	to	the	group	with	fewer	points.		
• The	computer	will	randomly	draw	one	ball	out	of	the	urn.	Thus,	each	ball	has	the	
same	chance	to	be	drawn,	namely	1/3.		
• The	computer	will	tell	every	member	of	your	group	whether	the	drawn	ball	
corresponds	to	your	group	or	to	the	other	group.	Every	member	of	your	group	will	
receive	the	same	clue.		
	
Note	that	this	procedure	means	that	a	ball	corresponding	to	the	group	that	actually	has	
more	points	has	a	2/3	chance	to	be	selected,	while	a	ball	corresponding	to	the	group	that	
has	fewer	points	has	a	1/3	chance	to	be	selected.	After	you	receive	this	clue,	you	again	
have	to	estimate	the	percent	chance	that	your	group	has	more	points	than	the	other	group.	
	
Note	that	the	urn	is	newly	filled	after	every	round,	according	to	the	points	received	by	
your	group	and	the	points	received	by	the	other	group	in	the	knapsack	problem	in	that	
round.	
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Market	Instructions	
	
	
In	every	round,	after	your	group	has	received	the	clue	for	that	round,	you	will	participate	
in	a	market	in	which	you	can	trade	assets.	The	market	participants	consist	of	the	6	
members	of	your	group.		
	
In	every	market	round	you	can	sell	and	buy	assets.	At	the	beginning	of	every	market	
round,	you	will	receive	an	initial	stock	of	assets,	and	an	initial	stock	of	cash.	At	the	end	of	
the	round,	you	will	be	required	to	repay	a	part	of	the	received	stock	of	cash,	the	loan,	from	
your	market	gains	(and,	if	your	market	gains	are	not	sufficient,	from	your	other	earnings	
from	this	experiment.)		
	
Assets	and	cash	stocks	from	the	market	are	not	transferred	to	the	next	round.	That	
is,	in	each	round	you	start	with	a	new	stock	of	assets	and	cash.	The	stock	of	new	assets	and	
cash	you	receive	is	independent	of	your	stocks	of	assets	and	cash	at	the	end	of	previous	
rounds	and	of	any	decisions	you	make	in	previous	rounds.	
	
The	asset	and	dividend	
At	the	end	of	each	market	round,	every	unit	of	the	asset	you	own	pays	a	dividend.	The	
dividend	depends	on	the	number	of	points	obtained	by	your	group	and	the	number	of	
points	obtained	by	the	other	group	in	the	knapsack	problem	in	that	round.	Specifically,	if	
your	group	has	more	points	than	the	other	group	in	that	round,	the	dividend	from	every	
unit	of	the	asset	equals	200	Rappen	(2	CHF).	If	your	group	has	fewer	points	than	the	other	
group	in	that	round,	the	dividend	equals	0	Rappen	(0	CHF).	The	dividend	is	summarized	in	
the	following	table:	
	 	 			
	 Dividend	per	unit	
Your	group	has	more	points	 200	Rappen	(2	CHF)	
Your	group	has	less	points	 0	Rappen	(0	CHF)	
	
	
Negative	asset	stocks	and	short	selling	
You	will	not	be	able	to	buy	assets	unless	you	have	sufficient	cash	to	pay	the	price.	
However,	you	will	be	able	to	sell	units	of	the	asset	even	if	you	do	not	currently	own	any	units.	
In	this	case,	your	stock	of	assets	in	that	round	will	become	negative.	This	is	called	short	
selling.		
	
If	you	sell	a	unit	of	the	asset	that	you	do	not	own,	then	you	get	to	keep	the	sales	price,	but	
you	will	have	to	pay	the	dividend	of	this	asset.	That	is,	for	every	unit	of	the	asset	that	you	
are	short,	200	Rappen	(2	CHF)	will	be	subtracted	from	your	earnings	at	the	end	of	the	
market	period	if	your	group	has	more	points,	but	0	Rappen	(0	CHF)	will	be	subtracted	if	
Example:	Suppose	that	a	participant	has	an	initial	stock	of	2	units	of	the	asset.	He	or	
she	buys	1	more	unit	in	the	course	of	the	market	activity.	Therefore,	after	the	
market	closes	the	participant	owns	3	units	of	the	asset.	If	that	participant’s	group	
obtained	more	points	than	the	other	group	in	that	round,	the	participant	will	
receive	a	total	dividend	of	3	*	200	Rappen	=	600	Rappen	(6	CHF).	However,	if	the	
participant’s	group	has	fewer	points,	the	participant	will	receive	a	total	dividend	of	
3	*	0	Rappen	=	0	Rappen	(0	CHF).	
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your	group	has	fewer	points.	
	
Note	that	you	also	might	directly	start	a	market	round	with	a	negative	stock	of	assets.		
	
There	are	constraints	on	how	negative	your	stock	of	assets	can	become;	that	is,	on	how	
many	units	you	can	short	sell.	The	computer	will	not	allow	you	to	submit	orders	that,	if	
executed,	are	likely	to	generate	losses	of	more	than	the	initial	loan	you	received.	This	will	
be	discussed	in	detail	later.	
	
How	does	the	market	work?	
Each	participant	in	the	market	can	buy	and	sell	units	of	the	asset.	Each	trading	period	
automatically	terminates	after	four	minutes.	During	this	time,	each	trader	can	submit	
offers	to	buy	or	sell,	accept	offers	to	buy	or	sell,	and	delete	offers:	
	
• Entering	an	offer:	You	can	make	an	offer	to	sell	or	buy	one	unit	at	a	specific	price.	
Each	offer	consists	of	a	price	at	which	you	are	willing	to	buy	or	sell	one	unit	of	the	
asset.	You	may	submit	multiple	offers	to	buy	or	sell	the	asset.		
	
• Accepting	an	offer:	You	can	also	see	a	list	of	all	the	outstanding	offers	to	buy	and	
sell	that	other	traders	have	entered	in	the	market.	By	simply	clicking	a	button,	you	
can	accept	the	best	current	offer	to	either	buy	or	sell.	That	is:	
− You	can	accept	the	current	offer	to	buy	with	the	highest	price;	in	this	case,	
you	sell	one	unit	of	the	asset	at	this	price,	or		
− You	can	accept	the	current	offer	to	sell	with	the	lowest	price;	in	this	case,	
you	buy	one	unit	of	the	asset	at	this	price.		
If	an	offer	is	accepted,	1	unit	of	the	asset	is	transferred	from	the	seller	to	the	buyer,	
and	the	trade	price	is	transferred	from	the	buyer	to	the	seller.		
	
• Delete	offers:	You	can	always	delete	any	of	your	own	outstanding	offers.	
	
Please	look	now	at	the	separate	sheet	“Handout:	overview	market	screen.”		This	handout	
illustrates	the	market	screen.	The	screen	shows	you	three	different	panels.	The	yellow	
panel	on	the	right	indicates	where	you	can	enter	your	choices	and	see	information	that	is	
relevant	if	you	want	to	buy	a	unit	of	the	asset.	The	green	panel	in	the	middle	indicates	
where	you	can	enter	your	choices	and	see	information	that	is	relevant	if	you	want	to	sell	a	
unit	of	the	asset.	Note	that	the	top	box	in	each	panel	is	where	you	enter	an	offer,	the	
middle	box	is	where	you	accept	an	offer	made	by	someone	else,	and	the	bottom	box	is	
where	you	see	all	the	current	offers	and	can	delete	any	of	your	current	offers.	
	
The	market	screen	also	reports,	in	the	panel	on	the	left,	a	list	of	the	trade	prices	of	all	
previous	trades	in	that	market	round	and	a	graph	showing	these	trade	prices	over	time.	
	
Restrictions	on	offers		
The	computer	will	prevent	you	from	submitting	any	offer	that,	if	accepted,	would	leave	
you	with	a	negative	cash	balance.	The	computer	will	also	prevent	you	from	submitting	any	
offer	or	making	any	trade	that	potentially	generates	losses	of	more	than	the	initial	loan	
you	received.		The	computer	will	also	delete	any	previous	offer	you	have	made	if	it	
becomes	the	case	that	completing	these	offers	would	put	you	in	these	situations.	However,	
keep	in	mind	that	your	earnings	from	a	market	round	can	be	negative,	in	which	case	your	
losses	will	be	subtracted	from	your	earnings	in	other	parts	of	the	experiment.		
	
The	computer	will	also	prevent	you	from	submitting	offers	that	do	not	improve	on	existing	
buy	and	sell	offers.	That	is,	the	price	of	a	new	offer	to	buy	must	be	higher	than	the	highest	
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price	of	all	current	offers	to	buy	and	the	price	of	a	new	offer	to	sell	must	be	lower	than	the	
lowest	price	of	all	current	offers	to	sell.		
	
How	your	earnings	from	the	market	are	computed	
As	explained	before,	at	the	end	of	the	experiment	one	of	the	rounds	will	be	randomly	
selected	and	you	will	receive	a	payment	equal	to	your	earnings	from	that	market	
round.	To	determine	your	earnings	in	a	market	round,	there	are	three	values	that	are	
important:	the	number	of	units	of	the	asset	that	you	own	when	the	market	rounds	ends,	
the	amount	of	cash	you	own	when	the	market	round	ends,	and	the	amount	of	any	loan	you	
received	at	the	beginning	of	the	market	round.		
	
Your	earnings	from	the	market	are	then	(in	Rappen):	
		
Units	of	asset	*	dividend	+	Cash	–	Loan		
	
That	is,	your	earnings	equal	the	total	dividends	from	the	assets	you	own	and	your	
remaining	cash	after	you	repay	any	loan	with	which	you	started	the	round.	As	explained	
earlier,	the	dividend	paid	by	the	asset	depends	on	the	relative	performance	of	your	group:	
	
So,	if	your	group	has	more	points	your	earnings	are:		 							Units	of	asset	*	200	+	Cash	–	Loan	
And	if	your	group	has	fewer	points	your	earnings	are:								Cash		–	Loan		
	
What	happens	if	the	stock	of	assets	you	own	is	negative?	
Remember	that	you	can	have	a	negative	stock	of	assets	in	a	market	round.	If	this	is	the	
case	at	the	end	of	a	round,	then,	you	will	have	to	pay	the	dividend	for	every	unit	of	the	
asset	below	zero	that	you	own.	Thus,	if	your	group	has	more	points	in	that	round,	Units	of	
asset	*	200,	will	be	a	negative	number	and	you	will	lose	200	Rappen	(2	CHF)	for	every	unit	
that	your	balance	is	below	zero.	Note	that	your	earnings	are	calculated	in	exactly	the	same	
way,	but	the	sign	of	Units	of	asset	is	now	negative.	
	
What	happens	if	your	earnings	are	negative?	
If	your	earnings	in	the	market	round	selected	to	count	are	positive,	we	will	add	them	to	
your	total	earnings	from	this	experiment.	If	your	earnings	are	negative,	we	will	subtract	
your	loss	from	your	total	earnings	from	this	experiment.		
	
	
	
	
	 	
Examples:		
1.	Suppose	a	round	is	drawn	in	which	you	hold	3	units	of	the	asset	and	300	Rappen	
in	cash	at	the	end	of	the	market	round,	and	your	initial	loan	was	700	Rappen.	
-	Earnings	if	your	group	has	more	points:	3*200	+	300	–	700	=	200	Rappen	(2	CHF).	
-	Earnings	if	your	group	has	fewer	points:	300	–	700	=	–	400	Rappen	(–4	CHF).	
	
2.	Suppose	a	period	is	drawn	in	which	you	hold	–3	units	of	the	asset	and	900	
Rappen	in	cash	at	the	end	of	the	market	round,	and	your	initial	loan	was	500	
Rappen.	
-	Earnings	if	your	group	has	more	points:	–3*200	+	900	–	500	=	–200	Rappen	(–2	
CHF).	
-	Earnings	if	your	group	has	less	points:	900	–	500	=	400	Rappen	(4	CHF).	
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Trial	market	round	
Before	we	start	with	the	experiment,	you	will	have	an	opportunity	to	familiarize	yourself	
with	the	market	through	a	trial	market	round.	The	trial	market	will	work	very	similarly	to	
how	the	market	will	work	during	the	experiment,	with	three	differences:	
	
• The	dividend	in	the	trial	market	depends	on	a	coin	flip	that	the	computer	will	
conduct	after	the	trial	market	round.	If	the	outcome	is	tails	the	dividend	is	200	
Rappen	(2	CHF),	if	the	outcome	is	heads	the	dividend	is	0	Rappen	(0	CHF).		
• You	will	participate	in	the	trial	market	round	with	5	other	randomly	matched	
participants.	You	are	therefore	not	matched	with	your	group	and	these	are	likely	
different	participants	than	those	with	whom	you	will	interact	subsequently.		
• This	trial	market	round	has	no	influence	on	your	earnings	from	this	experiment.	
However,	it	presents	an	opportunity	to	learn	how	to	use	the	market,	so	it	is	a	good	
idea	to	try	to	make	as	much	money	as	you	can.	
	
Once	you	are	ready	to	proceed	to	the	trial	period,	please	click	“OK”	on	your	screen.	If	you	
have	any	questions	during	this	trial	period,	please	raise	your	hand	and	wait	for	a	staff	
member	to	come	and	help	you.		
	
Handout:	overview	knapsack	screen	
	
	 	
Panel	B	
Panel	A	
Panel	C	
Panel	D	
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Handout:	overview	market	screen	
	
	
	
